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1. Introduction 
Due to increased longevity and low fertility rates after 1970 Norway will experience a significant 
ageing of its population throughout this century. According to population forecasts1 the ratio of those 
of working age 20-66 to those 67 and older decreases from 4.5 in 2002 to 2.5 in 2050. Although 
ageing in Norway is expected to be less pronounced than in most other OECD countries, Antolin and 
Suyker (2001) concludes that the existing welfare state schemes imply that Norway will experience 
one of the sharpest increases in public expenditures as a share of GDP after 2010. Three forces stand 
out as most important in driving this development. First, the public pension system is still maturing in 
the sense that the number of pensioners entitled to supplementary pensions is still increasing. Second, 
since there are no actuarial mechanisms in the public pension system, retirees receive their defined 
annual benefits over more years as they live longer. Third, the nominal value of public pension 
benefits is indexed to wage growth rather than to some average of wage and price growth.2  
 
The strength of the determinants of government expenditures is a result of policy, especially of the 
design of the public pension system and other welfare state schemes. Accordingly, another 
fundamental reason to the expected rapid growth in government expenditures is that successive 
governments have not yet undertaken cost saving reforms of the relatively generous welfare state 
schemes. One reason for lack of policy action may be that the apparently impressive current fiscal 
situation has not yet forced governments to do so. In an international comparison large petroleum 
revenues make the Norwegian Government an outlier with respect to financial wealth: According to 
the National Budget for 2005 (Ministry of Finance, 2004) the value of the Central Government 
Petroleum Fund (CGPF) was expected to reach 62.5 percent of GDP by the end of 2004. Measured as 
a share of Mainland GDP, it is expected to grow until about 2020.3 On the other hand, most other 
OECD countries have for several years struggled to limit public budget deficits. Even a decade before 
the baby-boom cohorts become pensioners, several EU-countries have problems with meeting the 
budget constraints defined by the EU Growth and Stability Pact.  
 
                                                     
1 See Statistics Norway (2002). 
2 Wage indexation is the political intention, and this assumption underlies all Norwegian projections of government pension 
expenditures. Effectively, however, the historical indexation has been somewhat less generous.  
3 The ratio between the return of the fund and trend-GDP for the Mainland economy was 4.5 percent of in 2005. This ratio is 
expected to peak at about 6.5 percent around 2030. 
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The current strong financial position of the Norwegian government gives a very misleading picture of 
the long run situation. Long run projections undertaken by the Pension Commission (NOU 2004:1), 
the Ministry of Finance (2001, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c), Aaberge, Colombino, Holmøy, Strøm and 
Wennemo (2004) and Fredriksen, Heide, Holmøy and Solli (2005) show that Norway faces a serious 
problem of fiscal sustainability as ageing boosts government expenditures after 2020. Since a 
substantial part of the problem can be attributed to the growth in the government pension expenditures, 
pension reforms have been high on the policy agenda, as in other countries. A Pension Commission 
appointed in 2001, delivered reform proposals in January 2004. The main proposal from the 
Commission, which implies a more actuarial public pension system, constituted the basis for the 
government reform proposal (Ministry of Finance, 2004c), which is scheduled for discussions in the 
Parliament during May 2005. Available to the Commission was a huge international literature on the 
economics of social security and pension reforms, as well as several earlier expert reports discussing 
pension reform issues in a specific Norwegian context4.  
 
However, comprehensive quantitative assessments of the effects of the proposed pension reforms have 
so far been missing. The purpose of this paper is to provide estimates of:  
1. The need for a pension reform. We do this by projecting how a continuation of the present 
pension system (and other welfare state schemes) will affect labour income taxation, 
represented by the payroll tax rate, given that the government budget deficit follows the 
current fiscal policy rule over the next 50 years. 
2. The long run macroeconomic effects of two pension reforms proposed by the Pension 
Commission, NOU 2004:1. We focus on the scope for tax cuts made possible by the reforms. 
In particular, we examine to what extent tax rates can be reduced as a result of expansion of 
tax bases generated by increased labour supply, rather than reduced average benefits. 
Stimulating labour supply has been one of the primary purposes of the pension reforms.  
 
To this end we combine a detailed dynamic micro simulation model, MOSART, with a large scale 
dynamic CGE-model, MSG6. The MOSART model provides a detailed description of the 
demographic dynamics, including the development of the labour force and the number of various 
kinds of pensioners. Being a micro simulation model it also provides a complete representation of the 
relevant heterogeneity of the population and an exact description of the Norwegian social security 
system. MOSART provides an accurate calculation of individual pension benefits and government 
pension expenditures for given individual work histories. Consequently, it provides precise estimates 
                                                     
4 Most notably, NOU 1998:10 and NOU 1998:19. 
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of what Coile and Gruber (2003) refers to as “mechanical” effects on these variables of pension 
reforms, i.e. effects for given behaviour and given wage rates and prices. We will in the following 
include these effects in what we refer to as “direct” effects, i.e. effects calculated outside the CGE 
model. The MSG6 model accounts for the equilibrium adjustments to the changes in government 
expenditures, labour supply incentives and private savings induced by the pension reforms. As the 
model is rather disaggregated, it captures the equilibrium adjustments of all tax bases and the prices of 
government consumption. It also provides a relatively rich description of the production structure, 
including decreasing returns to scale of industry production functions. This property implies a 
complex determination of the wage rate, and the wage adjustments have important feedback effects on 
the government budget, especially when government pensions are indexed to the wage rate.  
 
Quantitative assessments of the macroeconomic consequences of ageing abound in the literature. 
Chauveau and Loufir (1995), OECD (1998, 2000, 2001), the European Commission (2001) and Visco 
(2002) provide relevant international comparisons. The literature on numerical simulations of pension 
reforms has also become large, see Kotlikoff, Smetters and Walliser (2001) and Lindbeck and Persson 
(2003) for an overview. Some recent examples of studies within this field are Kotlikoff et al. (2001), 
Beetsma, Bettendorf and Broer (2003), Bovenberg and Knaap (2005), Miles (1999), McMorrow and 
Roeger (2002). Thøgersen (2001) and Fehr, Sterkeby and Thøgersen (2003) estimate the effects on 
macroeconomic aggregates and welfare of a reform of the Norwegian public pension system. All the 
referred studies utilise CGE models with a rather small number of agents representing overlapping 
generations. Even a specification of 12 lifetime earning classes in each cohort, as in the model used in 
Kotlikoff et al. (2001), loses many potentially important aspects of heterogeneity among agents and 
details of the pension system that are incorporated in a dynamic micro simulation model such as 
MOSART. Moreover, the MSG6 model provides a rather detailed description of commodity markets, 
thereby providing a more detailed determination of relative prices and the items in the government 
budget than what is the case in most OLG equilibrium models. However, accounting for details 
implies some costs in terms of loss of complete consistency. In our analysis most, but not all, of the 
general equilibrium effects computed by the MSG6 model are captured by the MOSART simulations. 
Our credo is that the shortcomings caused by lack of complete consistency are empirically less 
important than the details we have been able to account for. 
 
By including endogenous retirement behaviour in a dynamic micro simulation model, Coile and 
Gruber (2003) share some of our ambitions with respect to estimating the fiscal effects of Social 
Security reforms in the US. They find that the retirement responses have minor effects on the balance 
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of the Social Security system, because this system is close to actuarial. However, when other taxes are 
factored in, delaying retirement raises net government revenue. There are two reasons why we would 
expect that a pension reform stimulating labour supply at both the intensive and the extensive margin 
is likely to have a much stronger positive fiscal effect in Norway than in the US. First, since the 
present public pension system in Norway does not include any actuarial mechanisms linked to life 
expectancy, delayed retirement has first order budget effects. Second, the effective taxation of labour 
income is higher in Norway than in the US.  
 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes briefly the micro simulation model and the 
CGE model. In Section 3 we present a reference scenario in which the existing pension system is 
maintained, and we quantify the non-sustainability of the present fiscal policy. Sections 4 presents the 
macroeconomic effects of what we refer to as a More Actuarial Public Pension System (MAS), which 
is the main proposal from the Pension Commission. Section 5 presents the similar effects of another 
reform proposal, which we refer to as the Flat Benefit System (FBS), since supplementary public 
pension benefits are phased out in this reform. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Modelling framework 
In order to be relevant for estimating the effects of fully specified pension reforms the model 
framework should meet some fundamental requirements. First, to be operational the model must 
include a detailed description of the rules constituting the pension systems. Second, a detailed 
description of the population heterogeneity with respect to age and income is necessary for accurate 
calculations of individual and aggregate pension entitlements and benefits. Third, a detailed 
description of all tax bases, as well as of their determinants, is required for a full assessment of the 
development in public finances. The labour supply responses are particularly important in this respect. 
Fourth, the model should take into account that changes in relative prices affect the prices of 
government consumption and transfers indexed to wages. Fifth, analyses of fiscal sustainability 
require a long run perspective, which captures both the long run reform effects as well as the capacity 
effects of investments and productivity growth.   
2.1. The dynamic micro simulation model 
The dynamic micro simulation model, MOSART, simulates the life courses of a representative cross-
section of the Norwegian population. Fredriksen (1998) provides a detailed documentation of 
MOSART and examples of applications. The model captures the following events: migration, deaths, 
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births, marriages, divorces, educational activities, retirement and labour force participation. 
Transitions between states over the life course depend on individual characteristics, and the transition 
probabilities have been estimated from observations in a recent period. MOSART is especially 
designed to analyse the direct effects on individual pension entitlements and government pension 
expenditures of changes in the pension system. By direct effects we mean effects ignoring behavioural 
responses and general equilibrium effects. The model includes an accurate description of the pension 
rules, it captures all relevant details of the population dynamics, as well as the heterogeneity of the 
pension entitlements accruing to individuals. Labour market earnings and participation rates depend 
on individual characteristics, as well as earnings in earlier years. 
2.2. The CGE Model  
The CGE model, MSG6, provides a rather detailed description of the Norwegian economy based on 
National Accounts data. Heide, Holmøy, Lerskau and Solli (2004) provide a detailed description of the 
model structure and its empirical characteristics. The Norwegian economy is assumed to be too small 
to affect world prices. The exchange rate is normalised to unity. All agents have access to international 
capital markets where they face an exogenous interest rate. The economy as a whole obeys an 
intertemporal budget constraint. Goods and factors are perfectly mobile between industries. Supply 
equals demand in all markets in all periods.  
 
In each period consumers allocate an exogenous time endowment to leisure and labour according to 
standard consumer theory. The parameters are calibrated so that the uncompensated wage elasticity 
equals 0.1, consistent with the econometric results in Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm (1995). The 
composition of private consumption is determined in a demand system derived from a separable 
structure of nested origo adjusted CES subutility functions. Most imported products are close but 
imperfect substitutes for the corresponding domestic products. Firms are run by managers with perfect 
foresight, who maximise present net-of-tax cash flow to owners. Most producers of tradables allocate 
their output between the domestic and the foreign market. It is costly to redirect output between these 
two markets. Whereas world prices of exports are exogenous, firms engage in monopolistic 
competition in most domestic markets. Industry production functions exhibit decreasing returns to 
scale.5 
 
                                                     
5 The scale elasticities range from 0.85 - 1.00. Klette (1999) and Klette and Raknerud (2005) provide econometric evidence 
of decreasing returns to scale at the firm level in Norwegian industries. 
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The model includes comprehensive and detailed accounts of government revenues and expenditures. 
In real terms all expenditures are exogenous in MSG6, but the projections of these exogenous 
variables have utilised some specialised models developed at Statistics Norway.6 The projection of 
government pension expenditures results from a combined use of MOSART and MSG6. All tax bases 
are endogenous. In particular, the detailed classification of industries, commodities and various types 
of indirect taxes improves the accuracy of the computations of revenues from indirect taxation. The 
public budget constraint is satisfied by endogenous adjustments of the payroll tax rate, which serves 
the role as a representative of a broad tax on labour income.  
3. What happens in case of no pension reform? 
3.1. The existing public pension system 
The National Insurance Scheme (NIS) in Norway was established in 1967, and replaced a general 
public pension system consisting of a flat pension benefit. The NIS benefit includes three elements, a 
basic benefit, a special supplement and a supplementary benefit. The basic benefit and the special 
supplement constitute the granted minimum benefit. The special supplement is means-tested against 
the supplementary pension: 
 
Pension benefit = basic benefit + Max(special supplement, supplementary benefit) 
 
The supplementary pension is based on labour market earnings after 1967, and only persons born 1950 
and later will receive supplementary benefits based on their entire working career. Since each new 
cohort of pensioners will have a larger percentage of their working career included in the computation 
of their supplementary pension, the average benefit has grown and will continue to grow relative to the 
wage level until 2030. The growth in the minimum benefit and in female labour force participation 
also contributes to the growth in average benefit. 
 
The income basis for the supplementary benefit is the average labour market earnings over the 20 
years with highest earnings. Full pension is reached after 40 years of labour force participation. Using 
MOSART to account for all elements in the public pension system for a representative sample of the 
                                                     
6 The projections of government consumption within the sectors health care and education has utilised a model which 
decomposes changes in the input of labour and intermediate inputs into a) changes in the number of persons in different age 
groups; b) changes in the service standards; c) changes in coverage ratios. Thus, the projections capture the fact that ageing, 
cet. par., increases the public health care expenses. 
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Norwegian population, we find that increasing labour market earnings by 1 NOK raises the average 
present value of future pension benefits by 0.11 NOK. There is large variation in the individual 
increments in benefits. Moreover, the complexity of the rules makes it hard for individuals to compute 
the impact on pension benefits of increasing their earnings.  
 
Assuming that the political intention of wage indexation of both pension entitlements and individual 
benefits, the NIS benefits imply a pre-tax replacement ratio equal to about 50 percent for a person with 
40 years of labour market earnings and a steady and normal income level. Special tax rules for 
pensioners raises the average after-tax replacement ratio of NIS benefits to about 65 percent. Private 
pensions schemes and special pension schemes for public employees may increase the compensation 
level further. 
 
The formal retirement age in the NIS is 67 years. Both disability pensioners and early retirees obtain 
entitlements as if they were working until the age of 67. Roughly 40-50 percent of the population is 
receiving disability pension when reaching retirement age, and about 60 percent of the (still) employed 
are entitled to early retirement from the age of 62. Disability pension and early retirement imply that 
the present effective retirement age averages 59-60 years in Norway. Note that early retirement 
through these arrangements does not reduce future pension benefits at any point in time, neither 
because of a shorter period of labour market earnings nor through a longer period as pensioner. 
3.2. Key exogenous assumptions in all projections7  
• Population ageing: We rely on the middle alternative in the population projections presented 
in Statistics Norway (2002). The ratio of those of working age 20-66 to those 67 and older 
decreases from 4.5 in 2002 to 2.5 in 2050.8  
• The labour force: The population aged 20-66, increases by 13.6 percent, from 2.8 millions in 
2002 to 3.2 millions in 2050. 
• Public pension expenditures: Population ageing more than doubles the number of old-age 
pensioners from 2002 to 2050. This projection presumes that the age and gender specific 
transition rates from work to disability and early retirement observed in 2001 stay constant. 
                                                     
7 Appendix 1 and Fredriksen, Heide, Holmøy and Solli (2005) provide some more details on the exogenous assumptions. 
Further information is available from the authors. 
8 An important driving force behind the expected ageing is the increase in life expectancy. In the middle alternative in the 
projections presented in Statistics Norway (2002) the life expectancy for males increases from 77.0 years in 2003 to 84.2 
years in 2050. The corresponding increase for females is from 81.9 to 88.1 years. 
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The government finances about 40 percent of the early retirement benefits. We assume that 
pension entitlements are indexed to wage growth, which is the political intention.   
• Government consumption: We have made the rather cautious assumption that no changes take 
place in standards and coverage ratios of public services beyond already approved reforms. A 
plausible interpretation of our scenario is that the growth in private consumption per capita 
involves privatisation of services traditionally provided by the government sector in Norway, 
including care for the elderly.  
• Productivity growth: Based on historical trends Total Factor Productivity (TFP) grows by 1.3 
percent annually.9 
• World prices, except prices of crude oil and natural gas, measured in NOK, grow by 1.5 
percent annually.  
• The nominal interest rate is assumed to stay constant over the simulation period at 5.5 percent, 
which implies a 4.0 percent real interest rate in terms of foreign goods. This is in line with the 
assumption in the current fiscal guidelines, and with American interest rates in the second half 
of the 1990s. In their projections for the EU McMorrow and Roeger (2002) assume the 
nominal interest rate to fall from 5.5 percent to 5.25 percent from 2000 to 2050. 
• Petroleum revenues: In 2004 the export share of petroleum products was 45.8 percent, and 
taxes and other revenues from the petroleum sector amounted to 27.1 percent of total Central 
Government income. We have adopted the projections reported in Ministry of Finance (2001). 
Export of crude oil declines at an annual rate of 4.4 percent to 2010 in value terms. Thereafter 
the percentage annual decline will be approximately 5.4 percent. Export of natural gas is 
projected to increase by an annual rate of 6.8 percent to 2010 and thereafter to stabilise.  
3.3. Implications of maintaining the existing pension system  
Table 3.1 reports the development of some key variables in the reference scenario. Below we highlight 
the patterns of particularly relevance in the perspective of fiscal sustainability and pension reforms.  
 
On average private consumption per capita can grow at about 2.8 percent, implying a doubling after 
25 years, without violating the long run constraint on foreign debt. The annual GDP growth averages 
1.7 till 2050. The difference between the growth in private consumption and GDP reflects our 
assumption of zero-growth in the quality of government services. It is likely that private consumption 
                                                     
9 Private business industries are characterised by decreasing returns to scale in MSG6. Taking this into account, TFP grows 
by approximately 1 percent when computed by the standard procedure assuming constant returns. Labour productivity in 
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in such a scenario will include an increasing share of services that traditionally have been produced by 
government sectors. The estimated growth prospects demonstrate that in the long run productivity 
growth is by far the most important source of economic well-being, and that ageing has a much more 
moderate role in this respect. 
Table 3.1. Macroeconomic development in the reference scenario. Average annual growth 
rates in percent  
  2002-2025 2026-2050
Private consumption 3.4 2.2
Government consumption  0.8 1.3
GDP  1.9 1.6
Mainland industries 2.5 1.7
Wage cost per hour relative to world prices 2.8 2.8
Payroll tax rate -2.5 5.4
Consumer real wage rate  2.8 1.6
Employment 0.3 0.1
Government sector 0.5 0.9
Private business sector  0.3 -0.3
Government financial wealth relative to GDP 3.2 -1.0
Net national financial wealth relative to GDP 5.0 -0.4
 
However, one may question if the no-pension-reform scenario is politically feasible. The reason is that 
despite the substantial petroleum wealth and the assumption of constant quality of government 
services, the present tax rates are by far not high enough to ensure fiscal sustainability. On the 
contrary, such a broad tax on labour income as the payroll tax rate must be raised on a pay-as-you-go 
basis from the present level of 13 percent to about 25 percent in 2050, and it follows an increasing 
trend if the horizon is extended beyond 2050. Growth in public pension expenditures is the main 
source to the necessary rise in the payroll tax rate. Measured in percent of GDP, these expenditures 
grow from 5.3 in 2002 to 15.9 in 2050. Maturing of the existing pension system, as well as increased 
female labour market earnings, imply a 30 percent increase in the average public old-age benefit from 
2002 to 2050.10  
                                                                                                                                                                      
government sectors is assumed to grow by 0.5 percent per year, which is the standard assumption in the Norwegian National 
Accounts. 
10 The scheme for occupational pensions in the government sector guarantees that the sum of all old-age benefits to 
government sector employees equals two thirds of previous earnings. This implies that a reduction in the public pension 
benefit is exactly compensated by an increase in the occupational benefit. We have assumed that the pension reform does not 
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In addition, ageing after 2020 brings about a stronger growth in nominal government consumption 
than in the tax bases. Ageing alone implies an annual growth in government employment of 0.6 
percent from 2002 to 2020, about 1.0 percent in 2021-2040 and 0.3 percent thereafter. Prior to 2020 
there is, however, room for substantial reductions in the payroll tax rate without breaking the fiscal 
policy rule. The necessary increase in the payroll tax rate after 2020 adds to an effective tax on 
marginal labour income that is already rather high.11 If the continuous increase in the payroll tax rate is 
politically accepted, the resulting distortion of labour supply incentives is likely to cause a significant 
loss in social efficiency of the allocation of time. Moreover, an increase in rent seeking activities is 
likely. Higher international mobility of tax bases exacerbates both these problems. 
 
Our estimated continuous increase in the payroll tax rate after 2020 is much stronger than 
corresponding estimates for other countries. Projections presented in OECD (2001) show that 
budgetary pressures from ageing populations on average requires a 7 percent increase in the ratio 
between taxes and GDP. This exceeds the corresponding estimates in Chauveau and Loufir (1995) for 
the seven major economies. On the other hand, McMorrow and Roeger (2002) find that the ratio 
between social security contributions and wages in EU must increase from 16.1 percent in 2000 to 
26.9 percent in 2050, and this is due uniquely to the rise in the old-age dependency ratio. McMorrow 
and Roeger explain why their estimate of increase in public pension expenditures as a share of GDP 
from 2000 to 2050 is about 4 percentage points higher than the corresponding estimate made in the 
European Commission (2001).12 According to Feldstein (2005) the actuaries of the U.S. Social 
Security Administration estimates that the payroll tax rate must increase by 48 percent from today to 
2075 to finance the benefits specified in current law, i.e. about half of the percentage increase in the 
payroll tax rate in our reference scenario. However, the projection neglects the development in other 
government expenditures as well as general equilibrium effects. Taking these effects into account, 
Feldstein assesses that the necessary increase in the tax rate must becomes about 70 percent. The 
                                                                                                                                                                      
affect this scheme, but any increase in the occupational benefits is financed by higher premiums. Thus, continuation of this 
scheme does not imply any additional need for raising taxes.  
11 In addition to the payroll tax rate, its most important elements includes an average marginal tax on personal labour income 
approximately equal to 40 percent, compulsory social security premiums averaging 7 percent of wages, and net indirect 
taxation of consumption (including VAT) averaging 19 percent. In addition, the pension system, especially the early 
retirement scheme, magnifies the labour supply distortions at the extensive margin.  
12 It is somewhat unclear how the projections of McMorrow and Roeger (2002) should be interpreted. The referred estimates 
are taken from their Table 3 showing deviations between a scenario based on realistic population ageing and a "technical" 
scenario assuming no ageing. This suggests that the referred figures represent effects of a partial shift in demographic 
development, not projections as such. For example, the reported 19.0 percent decrease in GDP per capita by 2050 means that 
ageing, cet. par, contributes to reduce GDP per capita by 19.0 percent in 2050 compared to the technical scenario. If the 
changes in the ratio between pension expenditures and GDP are measured in the same way, i.e. as shift effects, it means that 
the role of growth over time, due to e.g. productivity growth and capital accumulation, on both pension expenditures (through 
indexation) and GDP is ruled out. 
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model based estimate in Kotlikoff et al. (2001) is somewhat higher; they find that the payroll tax rate 
must increase by 77 percent over the next three decades. With respect to welfare state schemes 
Denmark is more similar to Norway than the U.S. The Danish Welfare Commission (2004)13 projects 
that government expenditures in percent of GDP will increase from 52 percent in 2001 to 59 percent in 
2050 if the present welfare state schemes are maintained. Over the same period government revenues 
in percent of GDP will increase from 54 to 55 percent. One way of obtaining fiscal sustainability is to 
increase the base income tax rate permanently from 2011 by 8.7 percentage points, corresponding to 
an increase in the tax revenue-GDP ratio of 5.1 percent compared to a scenario based on constant tax 
rates.14  
 
The reference scenario also demonstrates that productivity growth in the private sector will not 
contribute to reduce the fiscal sustainability problems. This is an important lesson to learn: Policy 
makers cannot rely on the misconception that economic growth will finance the increase in 
government expenditure. On the contrary, in our reference scenario economic growth makes it 
somewhat harder to finance the Norwegian welfare state. It is true that productivity growth raises most 
tax bases. However, the government expenditure will increase even more. This result reflects that the 
government pension benefits are indexed to wages, that the real wage growth is basically driven by 
productivity growth, that productivity growth is stronger in the private sector than in the government 
production sector, that productivity growth does not have significant effects on labour supply15, and 
that the wage dependent government expenditures exceed the wage dependent government revenues. 
The latter condition is basically a result of the fiscal policy rule. This rule allows the government to 
run a deficit, excluding the net cash flow from the petroleum sector, equal to the expected real return 
on the government petroleum fund. Since this return is independent of the growth in productivity and 
wages, productivity growth, cet. par., slightly increases the difference between government 
expenditures and non-petroleum tax revenues. Alternatively, we might say that the relevant real rate of 
return on the government financial assets, i.e. the nominal return deflated by the price index of 
government expenditures, falls when the wage rate increases as a result of productivity growth in the 
private sector.  
                                                     
13 See Andersen, Jensen and Pedersen (2004) for a review in English. 
14 The estimate presented by The Danish Welfare Commission (2004) of the permanent increase in the base income tax that is 
necessary in order to obtain fiscal sustainability, is radically higher than the estimate in Jensen, Nødgaard and Pedersen 
(2001). The latter study concludes that "the fiscal policy in Denmark is almost sustainable, in the sense that a smooth tax rate, 
which fulfils the intertemporal budget constraint of the public sector is only 1.1 percentage point higher than the announced 
base tax rate for 2003. 
15 Aaberge, Colombino, Holmøy, Strøm and Wennemo (2004) find that income and substitution effects on labour supply 
caused by economic growth roughly cancel out.  
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4. Effects of a More Actuarial Public Pension System (MAS) 
4.1. Main reform characteristics 
The More Actuarial System (MAS) is supposed to be gradually phased in over a 15 years period from 
2010. It continues to be a pay-as-you-go financed system. We assume that the reform does not affect 
the fiscal policy rule, which implies that the pension reform does not change government savings.16 
The payroll tax rate adjusts annually to meet the same time path of the fiscal surplus as in the 
reference scenario. Although the reform strengthens the incentives to retire as a disability pensioner, 
the disability pension scheme is not altered. Moreover, we assume that the reform does not change the 
rates of transition from work to disability.  
 
The most important reform characteristics include: 
• The pension benefit continues to include two elements, a granted minimum benefit and an 
income based benefit. The minimum benefit is maintained at the same level as the current 
minimum benefit. Contrary to the basic benefit in the present system, it is means-tested 
against the income based pension benefit. 
• The system implies a stronger dependency between earnings and pension benefits. The income 
based benefit is basically 1.25 percent of lifetime labour market earnings with a few restrictions.  
• The current early retirement arrangements are phased out. They are replaced with a flexible 
retirement age from the age of 62 years available to everyone. However, the system becomes 
more actuarial as the pension benefit is adjusted in accordance with retirement age and current 
remaining life expectancy, such that the total value of future pension benefits remains roughly 
constant. However, special rules imply deviations from an exact actuarial adjustment.17  
• The income dependent entitlements are indexed by wage growth until retirement. The new 
system is calibrated such that those from the 1943-cohort who retire at the present statutory 
retirement age of 67 in 2010, will receive the same pension benefit in 2010 as in the existing 
system. However, over time the retirees receive lower annual benefits than in the present 
                                                     
16 The motivation of the fiscal policy rule is to ensure a fair intergenerational distribution of the petroleum wealth and to ensure 
that the use of the petroleum wealth is gradually increased. On the other hand, the main intention of the pension system is to help 
individuals to achieve a rational allocation of consumption possibilities over their life span. In this perspective, there is no reason 
why a pension reform should change the general long and short run considerations underlying the fiscal policy design.  
17 An important non-actuarial element is the exemption of 30 000 2005-NOK, corresponding to 28.5 percent of the present 
public minimum pension benefit, from the base of entitlements subject to adjustments to early retirement or increased life 
expectancy. Moreover, the annual benefits and pension premium are independent of gender and other observable 
characteristics correlated with life expectancy. 
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system since the received benefits will be indexed to the average of the growth rates of wages 
and consumer prices, rather than the wage growth.  
4.2. Direct effects  
Within our framework the reform to the MAS may affect the economy through four channels: 1) 
labour supply at the intensive margin; 2) labour supply at the extensive margin; 3) government 
pension expenditures; 4) private savings.  
 
We assume that the reform does not change the aggregate private financial savings. Any specific 
assumption on the private savings response is hard to justify due to lacking relevant empirical 
evidence. For example, Carman, Gokhale and Kotlikoff (2003, p.4) write: "Notwithstanding lots of 
careful estimation, the empirical literature provides little means of knowing precisely how a particular 
households' spending will respond to any given policy change." Under our assumptions on retirement 
behaviour (see below) the average annual public pension benefit will be nearly unaffected by the 
reform for individuals who works until old-age retirement.18 This is the main rationale for our 
assumption of no adjustment in private financial savings. Since neither government nor private 
financial savings changes, the time path of net national financial investments and the foreign financial 
assets will be the same under the MAS as in the reference scenario. However, aggregate savings will 
change as firms adjust their fixed capital stocks to changes in relative prices. The subsequent sections 
briefly give the reasons for our estimates concerning the effects working through channels 1 – 3. 
Appendix 4 provides some sensitivity analyses of the assumptions on the two labour supply stimuli, 
and we check the robustness of the effects of the MAS reform with respect to population ageing.  
4.2.1. Labour supply at the intensive margin 
Simulations on MOSART reveal that the average increment in the present value of future pension 
benefits of raising labour market earnings by 1 NOK, increases from 0.11 NOK to 0.20 NOK when the 
present system is replaced by the MAS. In addition, the reform makes the individual income 
dependency more transparent and more similar between individuals. All effects contribute to raise the 
effective marginal wage rate facing workers at the intensive labour supply margin. The aggregate 
incentive effect will be uncertain due to uncertainty about the effective tax element in the existing 
system. Moreover, the relevant weights used to compute the increase in the average marginal effective 
wage rate should take into account that low income workers are found to have a more wage elastic 
                                                     
18 Individuals who are disabled before they become old-age pensioners will experience a substantial reduction in their annual 
old-age benefits. However, the majority of this group has low income, which makes an increase in savings implausible.  
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labour supply than high income workers, see e.g. Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm (2000). Our 
preferred estimate, which we regard to be cautious, is that the increased income dependency of the 
benefits translates to an 8 percent increase in the average effective marginal wage rate.19 Appendix 3 
discusses in more detail to what extent rational individuals will consider the contributions necessary to 
finance the MAS-benefits as taxation or mandatory savings.    
4.2.2. Labour supply at the extensive margin 
Several studies find that labour supply is more elastic on the extensive than on the intensive margin, 
see e.g. Heckman (1993). However, the recent international empirical literature does not provide clear 
guidelines for assessing the magnitude of the effects of pension reforms on retirement. From 12 
comparable country studies Gruber and Wise (2004) concludes that the pension system has “enormous 
effect on retirement”. Chan and Stevens (2003) confirm that forward-looking measures of pension 
wealth only, and broader measures of wealth, are significantly related to individuals' expectations of 
continuing work into their 60s. However, they conclude that existing research, which largely ignores 
(unobservable) heterogeneity in tastes for retirement, may substantially overstate the responsiveness of 
individuals to pension-related incentives. Samwick (1998) finds that levels of pension and other 
wealth are not major determinants of retirement. Norwegian studies on retirement behaviour are 
surveyed in Hernæs, Røed and Strøm (2002).  
 
The MAS reform has both positive and negative effects on the average age of retirement. First, 
whereas about 60 percent of the labour force may retire at the age of 62 in the present system, all 
individuals get this option at the age of 62 in the MAS. This contributes to reduce the average 
retirement age. On the other hand, the reform increases the individual cost of early retirement. 
Whereas early retirement in the present system does not reduce benefits in subsequent years, the MAS 
implies that the annual pension benefits is cut in a close to actuarial way the earlier one retires. We 
will refer to this positive effect on the retirement age as the cost effect.  
 
As a starting point to assess the cost effect on the retirement age, we use the observed labour market 
participation rates for persons aged 60-69 in Norway in the early 1980s, when no early retirement 
scheme existed. These participation rates may serve as an upper boundary for what the labour 
participation rates in these age groups will be under a perfectly actuarial system. As a more realistic 
and cautious estimate we assume that a perfectly actuarial pension system would raise the present 
                                                     
19 If the difference between the interest rate and the wage growth is set to 2.5 instead of 1.1, this estimate falls to 5 percent. 
Assuming this growth-adjusted interest rate to be 0 implies an increase in the effective wage rate by 11 percent. 
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relatively low participation rates of these age groups to the average of the present rates and the rates 
observed in the early 1980s. Keeping the present life expectancy fixed, this response implies an 
increase in the average retirement age equal to 2.4 years. Taking into account that only 60 percent of 
the labour force has access to the present early retirement scheme, the postponed retirement 
corresponds to an increase in total labour supply of about 2 percent. This response is in line with the 
estimate in Brinch, Hernæs and Strøm (2001) of abolishing the present early retirement scheme. 
 
However, the cost effect of the MAS reform should be modified since it includes several non-actuarial 
elements. Most significantly, an amount equal to 30 000 NOK is exempted from an actuarial division of 
pension entitlements by the expected number of years as pensioner. We also believe that the gravity of 
62 years as the norm for the retirement decision will be stronger in the MAS. The reason is that 62 years 
will be the only statutory retirement age in the MAS, whereas the present system includes several formal 
age limits, most notably 67 years in the NIS, and 62 years in the present early retirement scheme. As 
pointed out by e.g. Gruber and Wise (2004) and Hernæs, Røed and Strøm (2002), statutory retirement 
ages are likely to have an important effect on the norm for what is considered to be the normal retirement 
behaviour. The empirical importance of these modifications is highly uncertain. We assume that they 
reduce the cost effect on the retirement age from 2.4 to 1.2 years. 
 
The cost effect is only relevant for the 60 percent of the labour force that have access to the present 
early retirement scheme. From this cost effect we must subtract the effect of making early retirement 
optional for the whole labour force. Provided that the retirement behaviour is not systematically 
different between the two groups, the ex post reform retirement age will be the same as the one 
assumed above. This implies that the 40 percent without access to the present early retirement scheme 
will reduce their retirement age by 0.3 years. As long as we ignore the effect of increased life 
expectancy, our estimate on the increase in the average retirement age of a more actuarial system 
becomes 0.6*1.2 years + 0.4*(-0.3 years) = 0.6 years. 
 
However, so far the estimates have been contingent on constant mortality rates. Increased life 
expectancy is likely to increase the retirement age in an actuarial system, see e.g. Bloom, Canning and 
Moore (2004) for a theoretical discussion. One reason is the preference for consumption smoothing; 
an additional year of consumption can be financed, at least partly, by postponing retirement. In 
addition, if increased longevity results from improved health, it can be interpreted as an increase in 
income, taking the form of more leisure time. At a given consumer real wage rate, the optimal 
response would be to exchange some of the leisure increment for consumption in the labour market. 
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Postponing retirement is one way of doing this. We are not aware of information about the empirical 
magnitude of the effect of life expectancy on the retirement age. Our best guess is that increasing life 
expectancy by 1 year increases the average retirement age by 0.4 years. This guesstimate takes into 
account that 40-45 percent of the population at age 62 either will be disability pensioners or prefer to 
retire as early as possible. The remaining share postpones their retirement by 2/3 years when life 
expectancy increases by 1 year. Such a postponement implies that the annual benefit can be kept 
approximately constant in the MAS. 
 
On the other hand, we believe that increased life expectancy will have a negligible effect on the average 
retirement age if the present system is maintained. The basic reason is that the annual benefit is indepen-
dent of the number of years as pensioner under the present system. Thus, if all consumption initially is 
financed by the benefit, this consumption-leisure combination can be maintained when life expectancy 
increases. If the initial consumption level is financed out of private funds in addition to the public bene-
fit, the consumption level cannot be maintained when life expectancy increases without increasing labour 
supply. However, at the statutory early retirement age the individual faces a kinked budget constraint 
when he decides to work or retire. At this age the effective marginal tax rate of labour income jumps to a 
very high level, because he simply loses the pension benefit that alternatively could be received.20  
 
Figure 4.1. Postponed retirement in the MAS and FBS. Deviations from the reference scenario. 
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20 Holmøy (2002) and Holtsmark (2002) estimate the effective marginal tax rate on labour income when the early retirement 
scheme is taken into account.  
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To sum up, we assume that replacing the present system by the MAS increases the average retirement 
age by 0.6 years when the present early retirement scheme has been phased out in 2015.21 Increased 
life expectancy strengthens the effect over time. Average retirement is delayed by 1.6 years in 2030, 
and by 2.6 years in 2050, see Figure 4.1. 
4.2.3. Government pension expenditures 
MOSART simulations show that the MAS reform implies a 16 percent direct cut in government old-
age pension expenditures in 2050. This reduction can be decomposed into the following sources: First, 
keeping life expectancy and indexation rules fixed, the average benefits increase by 3-4 percent when 
the MAS replaces the present system. Second, in the MAS annual benefits are indexed to the average 
of the growth rates of wages and the consumer price index. In the present system the annual benefits 
are indexed to the wage growth. Less generous indexation contributes to reduce government pension 
expenditures by 7-8 percent in 2050 compared to the reference scenario. 
 
The third source is the impact of a more actuarial cut in annual benefits to increased life expectancy. 
MOSART simulations show that this effect alone contributes to about 13 percent of the reduction of 
government pension expenditures in 2050. This reduction works through two channels. The first 
channel is a reduction in the number of pensioners. As explained above, those working until they 
become old-age pensioners will on average postpone retirement, so that their annual benefit will be 
approximately the same as it would have been under the present system. But the increase in the 
retirement age reduces the number of old-age pensioners in a given year. In 2050 the number of old-
age pensioners will be reduced by 11 percent (145 000) compared to the reference scenario, 
corresponding to the 2.6 years increase in the average retirement age. The other channel is a close to 
actuarial reduction of the annual old-age pension benefit to individuals who do not work prior to old-
age retirement. Disability pensioners are the most important example in this category. In 2050 this 
effect contributes to a 8 percent reduction of the average annual benefit received by all old-age 
pensioners. 
4.3. General equilibrium effects 
Table 4.1 shows the macroeconomic effects in 2050 of replacing the present pension system by the 
MAS when we account for both direct and general equilibrium effects through the iterative use of 
MOSART and MSG6. By 2050 employment is 10.6 percent higher than in the reference scenario, see 
                                                     
21 When the reform is implemented in 2010 the immediate increase in the average retirement age is only 0.1 years because it 
is assumed to take 5 years to phase out the existing early retirement scheme. 
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Figure 4.2. As firms also adjust their stocks of fixed capital, private consumption and GDP can be 
expanded in almost the same proportion. The slight difference between the growth in inputs and 
output, respectively, reflects decreasing returns to scale in the production functions. A 10 percent 
increase in private consumption per capita is a large effect compared to what can be expected from 
most other policy reforms. CGE estimates of the consumption effect of tax- and trade policy reforms 
are typically close to 1 percent. However, the effects of a pension reform need a long time to unfold. 
Figure 4.4 clearly brings out the point that even a 10 percent shift becomes rather modest compared to 
the consumption growth that normal productivity growth is able to generate over 50 years, 
independent of the pension system.  
 
The MAS reform makes it possible to reduce the payroll tax rate substantially in all years compared to 
the reference scenario, see Figure 4.3. Whereas maintaining the present system requires an increase in 
the payroll tax rate from the present level of 13.1 percent to 25 percent in 2050, only 11 percent is 
sufficient in 2050 in the MAS. The tax cut is possible due to reduced government pension 
expenditures and expansion of tax bases. Note that the increase in employment expands most tax 
bases, not only the bases for the personal income tax and the payroll tax. The ratio of government 
pension expenditures to GDP is 14.1 percent lower compared to the reference scenario in 2050.   
 
The fall in the wage cost deserves an explanation since it demonstrates that MSG6 accounts for 
mechanisms, which make the determination of factor prices significantly different from the textbook 
model of a Small Open Economy (SOE). In the SOE model factor prices would, under certain 
conditions, be unchanged according to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. Contrary to the SOE model, 
MSG6 captures the econometric findings of decreasing returns to scale, not only in extraction of 
natural resources such as crude oil, natural gas and hydro power, but also in Norwegian manufacturing 
industries. Decreasing returns to scale makes a decrease in factor prices necessary in order to meet the 
long run external balance constraint when the MAS reform expands the economy and thereby the 
demand for tradables. If the price of input factor did not fall, firms would not find it profitable to 
produce the additional exports needed to pay for the import growth. In the domestic markets, lower 
costs are transmitted into lower prices of Norwegian products, which induce Norwegian firms and 
households to reduce the import share in their demand. Appendix 2 provides a more thorough 
explanation of the equilibrium mechanisms determining the wage cost in MSG6. 
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Figure 4.4. Private consumption per capita.  Table 4.1. Macroeconomic effects of a More 
Thousand 2001 NOK Actuarial System. Deviations from the  
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Total employment 10.6
GDP  9.7
Private consumption  9.9
Wage cost per man hour  -8.4
Payroll tax rate -56.1
Real consumer wage rate,  
   excl. the pension effect 
5.7
Effective real consumer wage rate,  
   incl. the pension effect  
13.7
Net national financial wealth/GDP -3.2
Gross real investment   11.2
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However, the magnitude of the fall in the wage cost, which equals 8.4 percent in 2050, may appear 
surprisingly large compared to scale elasticities close to 0.85 and the roughly 10 percent expansion of 
the economy. If labour were the only input, and if the expansion reflected a proportional increase in 
exports of all tradables, a 1.5 percent drop in the wage cost would be roughly sufficient. Among all the 
forces affecting the wage cost in MSG6, most of the relatively large fall in the wage rate can be 
attributed to two effects. First, exports of crude oil and natural gas, constituting close to half of total 
exports, does not adjust to changes in the wage rate. Consequently, the relative increase in the 
adjustable part of total exports must be as large as 21 percent in 2050. Decreasing returns to scale 
makes the percentage increase in factors allocated to exports even higher, and the necessary reduction 
of the aggregate factor price index becomes more than 3 percent in 2050. Second, the cost share of 
wages is less than fifty percent in the dominating traded goods industries, even when the indirect 
labour content in domestically produced intermediates and capital goods is accounted for via the input-
output structure of the Norwegian economy. Since no other prices of primary inputs change, the 
necessary reduction of the wage cost must be more than twice as strong as the necessary reduction of 
the price index of all inputs.  
 
Consumers experience an increase in their real wage rate despite the reduction of wage costs because 
the reduction of the payroll tax rate is shifted over to the consumer wage rate, and because lower wage 
cost is transmitted into lower consumer prices.    
 
Figures 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 show that the effects in 2050 are not stationary. The reason is that the average 
life expectancy is projected to increase steadily over the whole century. The effects of replacing the 
existing system with the MAS will grow over time as the present public pension system becomes 
increasingly expensive as more retirees live longer, whereas the actuarial properties of the MAS 
prevent to a large extent increasing life expectancy to raise government pension expenditures. 
Nevertheless, the payroll tax rate follows an increasing trend also in the MAS scenario after 2020, but 
this basically reflects that ageing increases the government expenditures related to services used by the 
elderly. Note that prior to 2020 the demographic development makes it possible to reduce the payroll 
tax rate in every year. With the MAS it is even possible to cut more than the whole payroll tax. It 
should be stressed, however, that our models do not give a realistic picture of the short run 
adjustments to the pension reform. 
 
Table 4.2 decomposes the reform effects into contributions from the direct effects. The improved 
labour supply incentives at both the extensive and the intensive margin dominate the total effect on 
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employment. Postponed retirement enters MSG6 as two exogenous impulses: i) the number of 
pensioners falls, reducing the government pension expenditures; ii) the workers who postpone 
retirement represent an increase in the tax bases. Both effects make it possible to lower the payroll tax 
rate, which stimulates labour supply at the intensive margin. 
Table 4.2. Decomposition of the effects of a More Actuarial System. Deviations from the refer-
ence scenario in 2050 
 Employment,
percent 
Payroll tax rate, 
percentage points 
Consumer real wage,
percent 
1. Increased retirement age 5.6 -8.0 3.3 
1.1. Direct effect 4.1   
2. 8 percent increase in the effective wage rate 4.2 -4.5 1.2 
3. Reduced average benefits 0.6 -3.1 2.1 
4. Interaction effects (= 5 - 1 - 2 - 3) 0.2 1.7 -0.9 
5. Total effect 10.6 -13.9 5.7 
 
5. Effects of a Flat Benefit public pension System (FBS)  
5.1. Main reform characteristics 
In this reform alternative the public pension benefit is limited to a flat uniform pension benefit for all 
pensioners equal to the minimum pension benefit in the present system. The reform implies privatising 
the supplementary benefits in the NIS; individual benefits beyond the flat public benefit are left to the 
market, either through private savings or through occupational pension schemes. The flat benefit is 
assumed to be pay-as-you-go financed by adjusting the payroll tax rate. Feldstein and Samwick (2002) 
and Feldstein (2005) discuss how such a system could work. In our simulation we assume that the 
formal retirement age is reduced from 67 to 62. The flat benefit is indexed to wage growth and is not 
means-tested against any other sources of wealth or income. The reform is phased in from 2010. NIS 
pension entitlements accrued prior to 2010 are honoured.  
5.2. Direct effects  
5.2.1. Labour supply at the intensive margin 
Given our assumptions, MOSART simulations show that removing the income dependent 
supplementary pension in the existing system implies, cet. par., a 3 percent decrease in the average 
effective wage rate. Appendix 3 discusses in more detail why the tax element in the contributions 
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necessary to finance the public pension benefits will be much higher in the FBS than in the MAS. 
However, increasing tax cuts are possible as retirees receiving only the flat benefit gradually replace 
retirees entitled to pre-reform supplementary benefits. The resulting labour supply effect is examined 
in Section 5.3. 
5.2.2. Labour supply at the extensive margin 
The general access to early retirement from 62 years without any cut in the flat pension benefit, 
contributes to reduce the retirement age. On the other hand, the annual supplement from private 
savings will be actuarially adjusted to an increase in the expected number of years as a pensioner. 
However, under our assumptions (see Section 5.2.4) the annual benefit that can be financed by private 
savings on average accounts for less than one third of total pension benefit. Since the flat benefit is not 
actuarially adjusted, the effective subsidy of early retirement is greater in the FBS than in the MAS. 
Our preferred estimate on the average postponement of retirement is therefore reduced compared to 
the  MAS case. Specifically, we assume that employees on average retire 2 months earlier than in the 
reference scenario in 2010. However, the impact on retirement of increased life expectancy will be 
about the same as in the MAS case. Compared to the reference scenario, retirement will on average be 
postponed by 8 months in 2030 and by 1.5 years in 2050, equivalent to 2.5 percent increase in labour 
supply. 
5.2.3. Government pension expenditures 
As the retirees receiving pre-reform supplementary benefits die, the decrease in government pension 
expenditures becomes more significant in the FBS than in the MAS. Ex ante indexation, the average 
public pension benefit will increase slightly from 2010 to 2020, before it declines to about two thirds 
of the average pension benefit under the present pension system in 2050.22 Government pension 
expenditures ex ante indexation will be reduced by nearly the same proportion, given our assumptions 
of postponed retirement. Note that while government expenditures are almost invariant to the 
retirement age and the life expectancy in the MAS, this is not the case in the FBS since the retirees 
receive the granted flat benefit in all years.  
5.2.4. Private savings 
The removal of the public supplementary pension benefit will stimulate private savings. However, as 
noted in Section 4.2, any specific assumption on the private savings response is hard to justify due to 
                                                     
22 Measured in 2001-NOK, ex ante wage indexation of benefits, the average public pension benefit increases from 126 000 in 
2010 to 136 000 in 2020. Then it declines to about 100 000 in 2050. 
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lacking relevant empirical evidence. An extreme alternative is that the cut in public benefits is fully 
compensated through private savings. From the literature on savings behaviour, see e.g. Mankiw 
(2000), such a response is unlikely as an average response for several reasons. Our preferred guess is 
that private savings compensate for 75 percent of the loss in public benefits. 
5.3. General equilibrium effects 
Table 5.1 shows the macroeconomic effects in 2050 of replacing the present pension system by the 
FBS when we account for both the direct effects and the general equilibrium effects. Compared to 
maintaining the present pension system, the FBS stimulates labour supply, see also Figure 4.2. 
However, this stimulus, and thereby the general expansion of the economy, is considerably smaller 
compared to the MAS reform. Due to significantly lower government pension expenditures in the long 
run, the payroll tax cuts are stronger with the FBS than with the MAS after 2025. While the MAS 
makes a payroll tax rate of 11 percent sufficient in 2050, the corresponding tax rate can be reduced to 
6.3 percent with the FBS, see Figure 4.3.  
Table 5.1. Macroeconomic effects of a Flat Benefit System (FBS) and a More Actuarial System 
(MAS). Deviations from the reference scenario in 2050. Percent 
 MAS FBS
Total employment 10.6 4.8
GDP  9.7 4.6
Private consumption  9.9 5.7
Wage cost per man hour  -8.4 -2.3
Payroll tax rate -56.1 -75.6
Real consumer wage rate, excl. the pension effect 5.7 14.2
Effective real consumer wage rate, incl. the pension effect 13.7 11.2
Net national financial wealth/GDP -3.2 73.7
Gross real investment   11.2 7.1
 
There are two main reasons why employment is lower with the FBS than with the MAS. These, as 
well as other effects, are quantified in Table 5.2. First, as explained above, the average retirement age 
is lower in the FBS than in the MAS. Compared to the reference scenario in 2050, the direct labour 
supply effects are, respectively, 2.5 and 4.1 percent. Second, taking the labour supply incentive effects 
of the pension system into account, the effective marginal taxation of labour income is lower in the 
MAS than in the FBS. This is reflected in change rates reported in Table 5.1 for the effective real 
consumer wage rate, including the pension effect. The formal gross tax revenue is greater in the MAS 
than in the FBS. However, in the MAS the reimbursement of a significant share of the tax revenue to 
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retirees makes individuals perceive a significant share of the formal gross tax payments as mandatory 
savings. In result, the stronger income dependency in the MAS makes the effective net taxes smaller 
than in the FBS. Replacing the present pension system with the MAS lowers the effective tax rate by 8 
percent. On the other hand, all of the (remaining) government pension expenditures in the FBS must 
be financed by distortionary taxation. Appendix 1 explains the difference in effective taxation between 
the MAS and the FBS in greater detail. 
 
Privatising supplementary pension benefits also affects employment through other mechanisms. An 
important one is the income effect due to the double burden carried by the working generations under 
the transition from a (pure) pay-as-you-go pension system to a (more) funded system. Cet. par the 
transition from the present system to the FBS implies an income loss for the cohorts who must finance 
pre-reform supplementary benefits through taxes, because they cannot look forward to receiving such 
benefits themselves. This income loss stimulates labour supply and reduces consumption. The effects 
are particularly strong the first couple of decades after the reform is implemented, when the number of 
retirees with entitlements from the present pensions system is still high.  
Table 5.2. Decomposition of the effects of a More Actuarial System (MAS) and a Flat Benefit 
System (FBS). Deviations from the reference scenario in 2050 
 Employment, 
percent 
Payroll tax rate, 
percentage points 
Consumer real wage, 
percent 
 MAS FBS MAS FBS MAS FBS
1. Increased retirement age 5.6 3.4 -8.0 -5.0 3.3 2.0
1.1. Direct effect 4.1 2.5   
2. Reduced tax rate due to lower 
benefits, and changed income 
dependency 
4.8 0.2 -7.6 -6.9 3.3 5.7
2.1. Changed income dependency 4.2 -1.7 -4.5 2.1 1.2 -0.6
2.2. Lower benefits 0.6 1.9 -3.1 -9.0 2.1 6.3
3. Accumulation of financial assets 0 1.3 0 -7.7 0 6.2
4. Interaction effects (= 5 - 1 - 2 - 3) 0.2 -0.1 1.7 -1.1 -0.9 0.6
5. Total effect 10.6 4.8 -13.9 -18.5 5.7 14.5
 
MSG6 captures an important interaction between changes in savings, the real wage rate and 
employment. Since the government financial investment is unchanged compared to the reference 
scenario, the increase in private savings is basically matched by accumulation of foreign financial 
assets. Thus, the net accumulation of private pension funds requires increased net exports. Thus, the 
intertemporal reallocation of aggregate consumption must be associated with a temporary reallocation 
of resources from industries producing non-traded consumer goods to the traded goods industries. As 
pointed out in Section 4.3, such a reallocation requires a reduction of the wage costs from the 
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reference path due to decreasing returns to scale. As the aggregate pension fund converges to its 
desired level, net exports decrease compared to the reference scenario since a greater share of imports 
is financed by interest income. Thus, the wage rate can increase, and by in 2050 the percentage 
increase in consumption exceeds the percentage increase in employment and GDP. The dynamic wage 
rate adjustments transform the increase in individual supplies of savings into actual saving. Line 3 in 
Table 5.2 captures both the income effect experienced by the transition generation and the effect of 
accumulation of foreign assets, where the former dominates the latter over the entire simulation 
period: The temporary fall in the wage rate has only modifying effects on labour supply. It reduces the 
initial increase in labour supply and dampens the succeeding fall.  
 
The model also captures another important interaction effect: Pension reforms alone affect the wage 
growth, which in turn affects the balance of the public budget and thereby the room for tax cuts. 
Considering the FBS reform, this effect can be explained as follows: When public pensions are 
indexed to the wage rate, and because wage costs dominate government consumption, an increase in 
the wage rate yields a close to proportional increase in government expenditures. Whereas most tax 
bases in the Norwegian Mainland economy are also close to proportional to the wage rate, the share of 
the petroleum wealth, which the fiscal policy rule allows to be used each year, is independent of the 
wage rate. Hence, an increase in the wage rate generates cet. par a fiscal deficit, which must be 
neutralised by raising the payroll tax rate. This interaction effect contributes to modify the cut in the 
payroll tax rate made possible in the long run by the FBS reform. In addition to the weaker labour 
supply stimulus, it explains why privatising the supplementary pension benefits does not generate an 
even greater long run cut in the formal taxes compared to what is possible in the MAS.  
5.4. Comparison with related simulation studies 
The simplicity of the FBS system makes it a common reference system in the discussion of pension 
systems. However, differences between the initial public pension systems entail country specific 
effects of a reform to a common FBS even in the hypothetical case of identical models. Thøgersen 
(2001) uses an OLG model to simulate the dynamic effects of a FBS reform of the Norwegian 
system.23 Comparing long run effects, the reform makes it possible to reduce the labour income tax 
rate by 13 percentage points from the scenario in which the present system is maintained. Our 
simulation allows a reduction by 18.5 percentage points in the payroll tax rate in 2050. In addition to 
model differences, the difference is also likely to reflect more rapid increase in life expectancy in our 
                                                     
23 The FBS reform is called an individualized funding strategy in Thøgersen (2001). 
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scenarios than in Thøgersen's. This reinforces the tax cuts made possible by privatising the 
supplementary benefit. The steady state effect on employment is only 1 percent in Thøgersen's study. 
However, his study does not include changes in retirement. Moreover, intertemporal substitution 
makes the employment effects stronger in the years 2025 to 2070 than the steady state effects. After 
40-50 years employment is 4-5 percent higher than in his reference scenario, which is not so far from 
the 5.7 percent increase we find in 2050. 
 
Fehr, Sterkeby and Thøgersen (2003) has calibrated the OLG model used by Fehr (1999) to 
Norwegian data and simulates the effects of a FBS reform of the Norwegian pension system. 
Compared to Thøgersen (2001), this study captures endogenous retirement and income heterogeneity 
within each cohort. Compared to our results, Fehr et al. obtains much smaller macroeconomic effects. 
They estimate the long run increase in consumption to 2.0 percent, while private consumption 
increases by 5.7 percent in our simulation. (Even if one corrects for no growth in government 
consumption, a significant difference remains). The cut in the consumption tax is 4.0 percentage 
points in Fehr et al., while the cut in the payroll tax rate is 19 percentage points. Some of this large 
difference can be explained by differences in the population projections and the increase in 
government expenditures. Moreover, the initial equilibrium consumption tax of only 15.2 percent in 
Fehr et al., is very low compared to the VAT rate and other indirect tax rates. It indicates that the base 
of the consumption tax has been very broadly defined.  
 
Kotlikoff, Smetters and Walliser (1999) simulates the dynamic effects of a FBS reform of the US 
social security.24 The steady state effects on labour supply and the capital stock are, respectively, 1.2 
and 12.4 percent. These effects are less than one third of the effects obtained in the case of complete 
privatisation of social security. The reason is the same as pointed out in the interpretation of our 
results: Tax financing of the flat benefit implies that a substantial labour supply disincentive remains. 
Moreover, in Kotlikoff et al. (1999) the FBS reform reduces employment, the capital stock and output 
from the initial levels during the transition. It takes about 50 years before these variables pass their 
initial levels.  
                                                     
24 Kotlikoff, Smetters and Walliser (1999) refer to the FBS reform as "Privatisation with a Flat Benefit". In the simulation of 
this reform the income tax is used to finance accrued benefits. 
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6. Conclusions 
We have used a detailed dynamic micro simulation model together with a large scale dynamic CGE 
model to project the macroeconomic development of the Norwegian economy until 2050 under 
different public pension systems. The detailed description of population heterogeneity and the pension 
system in the micro simulation model allows accurate calculations of the direct effects on government 
pension expenditures of population ageing and pension reforms. The CGE model captures a rich menu 
of general equilibrium effects caused by changes in these variables. In particular, the CGE model 
accounts for endogenous adjustments of most tax bases and prices of government consumption. The 
two models are run iteratively to obtain consistency. Specifically, the equilibrium effects on the wage 
rate and labour supply has been accounted for in the results produced by the micro simulation model, 
and the necessary tax rate adjustments rely on the government pension expenditure projections 
produced by the micro simulation model, as well as the general equilibrium effects captured by the 
CGE model.   
 
The reference path shows that continuation of the present pension system contributes severely to make 
the present fiscal policy far from sustainable after 2020. In 2050 even such a broad based tax as the 
payroll tax rate must be raised to 25 percent, nearly a doubling from the present average of 13 percent. 
Moreover, a further steady increase is necessary when the time horizon is extended beyond 2050. The 
necessary increase in the tax burden after 2020 is much stronger than what is estimated for most of the 
seven major economies in Chauveau and Loufir (1995). Thus, the petroleum wealth is far from suffi-
cient to finance the Norwegian welfare state when one looks beyond 2020. The reference scenario is a 
good motivation for a pension reform that stimulates labour supply and establishes some kind of actu-
arial mechanism that motivates individuals to postpone retirement as they live longer. It is question-
able if the projected increase in the future tax burden will be politically approved. If it is, the effi-
ciency loss may be severe since the present effective tax rates are already relatively high in Norway.  
 
Any projection is uncertain. On balance, however, in our opinion the estimate of the necessary in-
crease in future tax rates is likely to be negatively biased, because it rests on the assumption that the 
standard of government services per user is kept constant over the whole simulation period. Such a 
development would imply a radical break with historical trends, including a much stronger growth in 
private than government consumption. It should also be noted that the scope for tax cuts before 2020 
rests on these assumptions, as well as on the presumption of a high degree of fiscal discipline. If the 
room for temporary tax cuts is instead used to improve the standards in the services directed towards 
the elderly, the need for raising tax rates after 2020 will be exacerbated.  
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Do the proposed pension reforms have significant macroeconomic effects? Our estimates suggest an 
ambiguous answer. On one hand, our estimated effects of the proposed pension reforms are very large 
compared to the effects of most other policy reforms. In sharp contrast to the 10 percent expansion of 
the Norwegian economy generated by the MAS reform, CGE studies of tax- and trade policy reforms 
typically estimate welfare gains less than the gains obtained over one year with normal productivity 
growth.  
 
On the other hand, pension reforms are not likely to matter very much for the average individual 
consumption level three decades or more ahead, cf. Figure 4.4. Our projections confirm Paul 
Krugman’s statement: “Productivity isn't everything, but in the long run it is almost everything. A 
country's ability to improve its standard of living over time depends almost entirely on its ability to 
raise its output per worker.” (Krugman, 1990, p. 9). Compared to several decades of exponential 
growth, most partial policy reforms will turn out to be rather insignificant, as long as they do not affect 
the growth rate. This is particularly true for a pension reform, which needs long time to unfold its long 
run effects 
 
Both reforms have a great positive effect on fiscal sustainability, which makes it possible to avoid a 
dramatic increase in the future tax burden. The effect is strongest in the FBS reform, which privatises 
the responsibility for supplementary benefits. In 2050 the payroll tax rate can be reduced from 25 per-
cent in the reference scenario assuming continuation of the present pension system, to 6.3 percent in 
the FBS alternative and 10.9 percent in the MAS alternative. These effects are not stationary; the pay-
roll tax rate follows an increasing trend in both reform scenarios after 2020. However, the necessary 
growth in the payroll tax rate after 2020 is foremost driven by growth in government consumption of 
services directed to the elderly. One may question if a pension reform should pay for the growth in 
these services.  
 
Basically, the scope for tax cuts created by the reforms is not driven by reductions of the average pub-
lic pension benefits. Instead most of the tax cuts can be attributed to the growth in tax bases generated 
by the positive effects on labour supply incentives. The MAS reform implies the strongest labour sup-
ply stimulus; in 2050 employment is 10.6 percent higher than in the reference scenario. The corre-
sponding increase generated by the FBS reform is 4.8 percent. When calculating the fiscal effects of 
the reforms it is important that our model framework takes into account that most tax bases are en-
dogenous and highly correlated with employment. 
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The effective marginal tax rate on labour income is lower in the MAS than in the FBS, despite higher 
formal tax rates in the MAS than in the FBS. This reflects that a greater share of the total average 
benefit is actuarially adjusted to early retirement and increased life expectancy in the MAS compared 
to the FBS. Moreover, due to a higher perceived correlation between labour market earnings and 
public pension benefits in the MAS than in the FBS and the present system, a substantial share of the 
formal tax on labour income is regarded as mandatory savings rather than a distortionary tax in the 
MAS. The difference between the effective marginal tax rates on labour income is the main reason 
why the increase in employment is stronger in the MAS than in the FBS.  
 
Large effective tax rate on the consumers’ return to work implies that the reallocation of time from 
leisure to market work improves the social efficiency. The most important elements of the effective 
marginal tax rate on labour income include an average marginal tax on personal labour income of 
approximately 40 percent, a payroll tax rate averaging 13 percent, and net indirect taxation of 
consumption, including VAT, averaging 19 percent. The tax wedge made up by these tax rates makes 
the ratio between the social and the private marginal rate of transformation of leisure into consumption 
as large as 2.3.25 The increase in the payroll from the present 13 percent to 25 percent in 2050 in the 
reference scenario exacerbates the distortion of time allocation. To the extent that employment 
increases as a result of delayed retirement the efficiency gain will be even larger because leisure 
through early retirement is heavily subsidised under the present pension system.  
 
Transformation of increased labour supply and individual savings into higher employment and more 
assets involve equilibrium adjustments of the real wage rate and industry structure that may be hard 
to realise. In particular, as explained in Section 5.3, a higher degree of pre-funding of future pension 
expenditures must mainly take place through net financial investments in foreign assets. Accumulation 
of foreign assets cannot take place unless real resources are reallocated from consumption to net 
exports. However, the traded goods sector, e.g. manufacturing industries, will not be willing to employ 
more labour unless the real wage cost is sufficiently reduced. Thus, cet. par pre-funding warrants 
slower real wage growth. One aspect of the diagnosis "Dutch Disease" is that re-industrialisation may 
be much harder to carry through than the process involving real exchange rate appreciation and de-
industrialisation. Like many other open economies, Norway has experiences which makes it 
questionable to what extent the actual wage formation follows the norm defined by the textbook 
equilibrium model of a small open economy. The temporary large revenues from the petroleum sector 
have probably increased the problems of bringing the wage growth in accordance with what is 
                                                     
25 See Fæhn and Holmøy (2000) for a derivation of this estimate. 
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sustainable in a long run perspective.26 More pre-funding exacerbates problems caused by rigidities in 
the wage setting.  
 
The welfare state is already under pressure, and ageing will further erode its financial basis. In Norway 
the large cash flows from rapid transformation of petroleum wealth to financial assets makes the 
problems of fiscal sustainability less transparent than in other OECD economies. This makes long run 
macroeconomic projections even more relevant in Norway than in other countries. In particular these 
projections should quantify the consequences of different changes in the government provision of 
subsidised welfare services and income replacement schemes. Analyses similar to those undertaken by 
the Danish Welfare Commission (Velfærdskommissionen, 2004) seem highly relevant also in the 
Norwegian context and are high on our agenda for future research.  
 
Such projections should be based on models that cannot be blamed for ignoring available relevant 
information. This apparently obvious ambition has a more controversial and perhaps non-fashionable 
implication: accuracy, gained by including a disaggregated classification of e.g. tax bases, exact 
descriptions of the tax- and pension systems, detailed modelling of population heterogeneity and 
market structures affecting the real time dynamics of policy reforms, should be given priority over 
analytical tractability and transparency. Although the model work underlying this paper has gone quite 
a long way in order to account for details of potential relevance, there is obvious scope for 
improvements. Specifically, consistency can be improved by merging the most important aspects of 
individual life courses and the general equilibrium mechanisms into a CGE-model with overlapping 
generations and income heterogeneity within each cohort. Moreover, since labour supply at both the 
intensive and the extensive margins, as well as savings behaviour are crucial for the results, future 
modelling work should probably give priority to capture the heterogeneity of this behaviour found in 
micro econometric studies.  
                                                     
26 Holmøy and Heide (2005) analyses the scope for sustainable real wage growth in the Norwegian economy. 
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Appendix 1 
Exogenous assumptions in the projections and background facts 
Table A1.1. Demographic assumptions in the reference scenario  
Net immigration 13 000 persons per year 
Life expectancy at birth Increases gradually. 7-8 years higher in 2050 than in 2005 
Fertility rate 1.8  
Education Educational transition rates as in 2001 
Disability Transition from work to disability as in 2001 
Early retirement Transition rates as in 2001 
Official retirement age 67 years 
Labour participation  As in 2001  
Wage distribution As the average over the years 1967-1993 
 
Table A1.2. Historical and projected development in the number of pensioners and the labour 
force in the reference scenario. Thousand persons 
 1962 1970 1980 1991 2000 2002 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060
Old age pensioners 234 335 520 616 629 623 679 873 1074 1259 1317 1419
Disability pensioners 68 130 160 239 280 295 365 388 396 379 407 419
Widow pensioners  58 57 77 68 51 22 17 14 11 10 8
Total number of pensioners 302 523 737 932 977 969 1066 1278 1484 1649 1734 1846
Labour Force 1570 1653 1940 2126 2350 2378 2477 2564 2587 2612 2669 2686
Pensioners in percent of the  
Labour Force 
 
19 32 38 44 42 41 43
 
50 
 
57 63 65 69
Source: Own computations and Ministry of Finance (2001). 
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Table A1.3. Projections of important exogenous variables in the scenarios. Average annual 
growth rates. Percent 
 2002-2010 2011-2020 2031-2060 
Total factor productivity (TFP), private sector 1.30 1.30 1.30 
Labour productivity in government sectors 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Employment, man-hours 0.39 0.20 -0.05 
World prices 1.50 1.50 1.50 
Crude oil price -4.30 1.75 1.75 
Natural gas price -1.22 1.45 1.75 
International nominal interest rate  5.50 5.50 5.50 
 
Table A1.4. Old-age dependency ratios in the EU and Norway 
 2000 2050  2000 2050 
Belgium 0.28 0.50 Luxemburg 0.23 0.42 
Denmark 0.24 0.42 Netherlands* 0.22 0.40 
Germany 0.26 0.53 Austria 0.25 0.55 
Greece 0.28 0.59 Portugal 0.25 0.49 
Spain 0.27 0.66 Finland 0.24 0.48 
France 0.27 0.51 Sweden 0.30 0.46 
Ireland 0.19 0.44 UK 0.26 0.46 
Italy 0.29 0.67 Norway** 0.22 0.37 
Source: Eurostat, (*) Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics, (**) Statistics Norway. 
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Appendix 2 
The determination of the equilibrium wage cost in MSG6  
MSG6 captures important interaction effects between government net revenues, the wage rate, the 
endogenous payroll tax rate and the accumulation of foreign assets. The purpose of this appendix is to 
explain the main mechanisms of the wage rate determination in MSG6. These mechanisms are more 
complex than in the textbook model of a Small Open Economy (SOE), since MSG6 has incorporated 
econometric evidence of decreasing returns to scale at the firm and the industry level. We also explain 
how the equilibrium wage cost adjusts to exogenous shifts in labour supply and savings caused by the 
pension reforms.  
 
In principle, the version of MSG6 used in this paper can be reduced to a system of two equilibrium 
conditions, which determines the wage cost per man-hour and the utility level of the representative 
consumer. These conditions are depicted by the two curves LL and BB drawn in the wage-utility 
diagram in Figure A.1. The LL- and BB-loci describe the wage and utility combinations that are 
consistent with, respectively, labour market equilibrium and the budget constraint for the total 
economy implied by the external balance requirement. The point where the two loci intersect 
represents the general equilibrium. The subscripts “0” and “1” denote, respectively, the pre- and post-
reform situations. 
 
The LL-locus is upward sloping because an increase in the utility level, cet. par, causes households to 
decrease labour supply and increase consumption of goods. Both effects contribute to excess demand 
for labour. For a fixed payroll tax rate, increasing the wage rate restores labour market equilibrium 
through the following mechanisms:  
1) At given output levels a partial increase in the wage rate causes firms to choose a less labour 
intensive factor composition.  
2) Changes in the industry structure reinforce the fall in labour demand. The higher wage rate 
shifts the unit cost functions upwards, especially in the most labour intensive industries. For 
import competing, as well as exporting Norwegian producers, the international 
competitiveness deteriorates, causing a negative scale effect on labour demand. In addition, 
households will face an increase in the relative price of domestic goods produced by the most 
labour intensive technologies, and substitute less labour intensive ones for these. In the 
standard SOE model the assumptions of constant returns to scale in each sector and perfect 
intersectoral mobility of factors make the aggregate factor demands infinitely elastic with 
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respect to factor prices. Excess labour demand would be eliminated by a reallocation of factors 
from the most labour intensive sector into the other sectors, without any adjustments in the 
factor prices. In MSG6 decreasing returns to scale makes it possible for firms and sectors to 
adjust output to keep the producer value of marginal factor productivities equal to changing 
factor prices. 
3) The real consumer wage rate rises, and households substitutes consumption for leisure along 
the fixed indifference curve. This substitution implies a simultaneous rise in both labour 
supply and induced labour demand, having opposite effects on excess demand for labour. Due 
to taxation of labour income and consumption, as well as import leakage, the former will 
unambiguously dominate.  
 
This relationship is complicated by the endogenous adjustment of the payroll tax rate keeping the 
government budget surplus fixed. An increase in consumption raises the revenue from indirect 
taxation. However, the reduction of revenue from taxation of labour is greater, so the payroll tax rate 
must increase. For a given consumer wage rate, the increase in the payroll tax rate reduces labour 
demand through the same mechanisms as those operating in the case of a rise in the wage rate. Thus, 
the government budget constraint implies a negative modification of the increase in the wage rate that 
restores labour market equilibrium.  
 
The BB-locus is downward sloping because a partial increase in the utility level implies that 
households increase their consumption of imported goods. In addition, the increase in the payroll tax 
rate raises wage costs, which deteriorates the international competitiveness. A fall in the wage rate 
restores the equilibrium surplus through export expansion, substitution of domestic deliveries for 
imports, and substitution of leisure for consumption.  
 
Equilibrium adjustments to exogenous shifts in labour supply 
Postponed retirement and a stronger correlation between labour market earnings and public pension 
benefits represent positive shifts in labour supply schedule. They shift the LL-locus outwards from 
L0L0 to L1L1 in Figure A2.1. Restoring labour market equilibrium requires a fall in the wage cost and 
higher demand for consumption and leisure following from higher utility. The equilibrium moves from 
A to B.  
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Equilibrium adjustments to exogenous shifts in savings 
An exogenous positive shift in private savings must raise national savings by the same amount when 
government savings is fixed. Assuming the increase in savings to exceed the endogenous change in 
fixed capital investments, national financial investments must increase. In equilibrium, the increase in 
national financial investments must be brought about by increased in current account surplus, which in 
turn warrants higher net exports. The wage cost must fall to make the necessary increase in net exports 
profitable for firms characterised by decreasing returns to scale. Thus, in a year characterised by 
higher savings and higher net exports, the BB-locus shifts downwards from B0B0 to B1B1 in Figure 
A2.1. The equilibrium moves from A to C.  
 
Figure A2.1. Determination of utility of the representative consumer and the wage cost in MSG6 
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Appendix 3 
Effective taxation implied by the MAS and the FBS 
The purpose of this appendix is to use a somewhat stylised numerical example to shed light on how 
replacing the present public pension system by the More Actuarial System (MAS) or the Flat benefit 
System (FBS) affect the effective taxation of labour income. For simplicity we consider a stationary 
population and ignore interest and wage growth. We start by assuming that individuals of the same age 
are identical. The individual lives as a retiree for 20 years. His lifetime earnings is equal to 220G, 
where G is the accounting unit used in the Norwegian National Insurance system. By the end of 2004 
one G was 58 778 NOK, and the minimum pension received by a single retiree was 1.8G in 2005.  
 
In the FBS the flat benefit is equal to the minimum benefit in the present system, i.e. 1.8G. In order to 
finance his own flat benefit by a flat tax rate, the person must pay 1.8*20/220 = 16.3 percent of his 
average annual earnings. This is a purely distortionary tax rate. Since all individuals are identical this 
tax rate finances the government expenditures related to the flat benefit.  
 
In the MAS only a fraction of the public pension benefits will be financed by taxes. Instead, rational 
individuals will consider most of the contributions as mandatory savings. We shall assume that the 
benefits that unambiguously must be financed by (distortionary) taxes averages 0.1G per year per 
retiree. The flat tax rate necessary to finance this amount equals (0.1G/year)*(20 years)/(220G) = 0.9 
percent. In addition, the individuals must pay contributions. According to the MAS rules the 
contribution rate becomes (1.25 percent/year)*(20 years) = 25 percent. To what extent this 
contribution rate is regarded as a tax or mandatory savings depends on the lifetime earnings. We must 
now distinguish between four categories of individuals: 
1. Retirees receiving the minimum benefit. The lifetime earnings of these is less than 80G. About 
5 percent of the population belongs to this category. Marginal changes in their labour market 
earnings will not change their benefit from the minimum level. Thus, they will regard all 
contributions as taxation. Therefore, their marginal tax rate related to financing the public 
pension benefits will be 0.9 percent + 25.0 percent = 25.9 percent. 
2. Individuals with lifetime earnings in the interval 80G - 187G. About 15 percent of the 
population belongs to this category. Their marginal tax rate related to financing the public 
pension benefits will be 0.9 percent + 25.0 percent*0.6 = 17.1 percent. 
44 
3. Individuals with lifetime earnings higher than 187G but annual income lower than 8G. About 
70 percent of the population belongs to this category. Their marginal tax rate related to 
financing the public pension benefits will be only 0.9 percent. 
4. Individuals with lifetime earnings higher than 187G and annual income higher than 8G. About 
10 percent of the population belongs to this category. These individuals will not receive higher 
benefits by working more in the MAS. It is not decided whether these individuals shall pay 25 
percent as a surtax, or if they will pay no contributions out of annual income exceeding 8G. 
Their marginal tax rate related to financing the public pension benefits will be 25.9 percent in 
the first case, and 0.9 percent in the latter case. 
 
If individuals in category 4 pay no contributions out of annual income exceeding 8G, the 
population weighted average of the marginal tax rates associated with financing the MAS benefits 
equals 0.05*25.9 percent + 0.15*17.1 percent + 0.70*0.9 percent + 0.10*0.9 percent = 4.6 percent. 
If the marginal tax rate paid by category 4 is 25 percent, the average marginal tax rate becomes 
0.05*25.9 percent + 0.15*17.1 percent + 0.70*0.9 percent + 0.10*25.9 percent = 7.1 percent.  
 
In both cases the average marginal tax rate associated with financing the public pension benefits is 
much lower than the 16.3 percent characterising the FBS. In this stylised example individuals in 
category 3 regard all mandatory contributions as equivalent to voluntary savings. It is unlikely that 
all individuals in this large category share such a perception. In the model calculations we have 
therefore increased the effective tax rates for category 2 and 3 somewhat compared to this 
example.  
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Appendix 4 
Sensitivity analysis of the MAS effects 
We have checked the sensitivity of the effects of replacing the present public pension system by the 
More Actuarial System (MAS) with respect to  
• the impact on the effective marginal wage rate, 
• the impact on the retirement decision,  
• the mortality assumptions, i.e. longevity. 
  
The impact on the effective marginal wage rate 
In the main MAS scenario the average effective marginal wage rate was assumed to increase by 8 
percent due to higher correlation between earnings and benefits. In an alternative scenario we have 
assumed that the corresponding wage effect is 10 percent. The stronger labour supply stimulus causes 
employment to increase from 10.6 to 11.6 percent relative to the reference scenario in 2050. 
Table A4.1. Sensitivity of the MAS reform effects to the impact on the effective marginal wage 
rate. Deviations from the reference scenario in 2050. Percent* 
 8 percent  10 percent  
Employment 10.6 11.6 
Private consumption 9.9 10.8 
GDP 9.7 10.6 
*Payroll tax rate, percentage points -13.9 -14.7 
Consumer real wage rate 5.7 6.0 
 
The retirement decision 
We have calculated the effects of the MAS reform assuming no change in the retirement age compared 
to the reference scenario. On the other hand, in the main MAS alternative the reform caused the 
retirement age to increase gradually over time from the reference path. In 2050 retirement was delayed 
by 2.6 years.  
 
The actuarial mechanism in the MAS, represented by the life expectancy adjustment ratio, now causes 
a cut in the average annual benefit also for those working until retirement. On the other hand the 
number of retirees does not fall compared to the reference scenario. On balance, the reduction in 
government pension expenditures is approximately insensitive to variations in the retirement age, 
illustrating the actuarial characteristics of the MAS. The labour supply effect is, however, much 
weaker under the alternative assumption, since there is no contribution from delayed retirement. 
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Employment increases by 5.7 percent compared to the reference scenario in 2050, nearly 5 percentage 
points less than in the main MAS alternative. Accordingly, the expansion of the tax bases is also 
smaller than in the main alternative, leaving a smaller room for tax cuts. The deviation between the 
main MAS alternative and the alternative where there is no effect on retirement, increases over time.  
Table A4.2. Sensitivity of the MAS reform effects to delayed retirement. Deviations from the 
reference scenario in 2050. Percent* 
 2.6 years delay  No delay 
Employment 10.6 5.7 
Private consumption 9.9 5.5 
GDP 9.7 5.3 
*Payroll tax rate, percentage points -13.9 -11.4 
Consumer real wage rate 5.7 6.1 
 
Longevity 
Since the MAS is much more actuarial than the present public pension system, we expect the 
assumptions on mortality to be crucial for the reform effects. We have re-calculated the MAS reform 
effects when the “Middle alternative” in the population forecast (Statistics Norway, 2002) is replaced 
by the socalled “High alternative”. Compared to the Middle alternative, the latter assumes higher 
fertility rates and net immigration, and reduced mortality. The average life expectancy for females 
increases from 88.1 to 90.0 years in 2050. The corresponding increase for males is from 84.2 to 86.7 
years.  
 
As expected, the effects of the MAS are reinforced when retirees live longer. Based on our 
assumptions in Section 4, the increase in life expectancy will raise the average retirement age in 2050 
by nearly 3.6 years, one additional year compared to the corresponding effect in the main MAS 
scenario. Including the general equilibrium effects, the corresponding magnification of the 
employment effect in 2050 is 2.1 percentage points.  
Table A4.3. Sensitivity of the MAS reform effects to the assumptions on average longevity. De-
viations from the reference scenario in 2050. Percent* 
 Middle alternative High alternative 
Employment 10.6 12.7 
Private consumption 9.9 11.6 
GDP 9.7 11.5 
*Payroll tax rate, percentage points -13.9 -14.9 
Consumer real wage rate 5.7 7.2 
 
